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Abstract—This paper is concerned with several security notions
for information theoretically secure encryptions defined by the
variational (statistical) distance. To ensure the perfect secrecy
(PS), the mutual information is often used to evaluate the
statistical independence between a message and a cryptogram.
On the other hand, in order to recognize the information
theoretically secure encryptions and computationally secure ones
comprehensively, it is necessary to reconsider the notion of
PS in terms of the variational distance. However, based on
the variational distance, three kinds of definitions for PS are
naturally introduced, but their relations are not known. In this
paper, we clarify that one of three definitions for PS with the
variational distance, which is a straightforward extension of
Shannon’s perfect secrecy, is stronger than the others, and the
weaker two definitions of PS are essentially equivalent to the
statistical versions of indistinguishability and semantic security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Perfect secrecy (PS) is a strong security notion which is
secure against an adversary with unbounded computing power.
Perfect secrecy was defined by Shannon [1], and he proved that
perfect secrecy is achieved by one time pad (Vernam) cipher
[2]. Furthermore, in order to achieve perfect secrecy, Shannon
also proved in [1] that the entropy of a key must be greater
than the entropy of a message, which makes perfect secrecy
quite impractical.
Roughly speaking, PS is defined by the statistical indepen-
dence between a message M and a cryptogram C. Specifically,
we often require almost statistical independence between C
and M to ensure PS. We note here that two metrics can be
used to measure the almost statistical independence, i.e., the
mutual information and the variational (statistical) distance. In
general, the mutual information is often used in information
theoretic cryptography since it guarantees stronger security
compared to the security notions based on the variational
distance due to Pinsker’s inequality. On the other hand, the
variational distance is often used in computationally secure
cryptography: For instance, indistinguishability (IND) and
semantic security (SS) are defined in terms of the variational
distance. We note that several researchers recently discussed
one time pad cipher under the security notions developed in
computationally secure cryptography. For instance, Russell–
Wang [3] introduced entropic security based on semantic
security, and they succeeded in shortening the key length of
a symmetric key cryptosystem which is secure against an
unbounded adversary. In addition, Dodis–Smith [4] introduced
another security notion which is closely related to indistin-
guishability, and they gave the other realization of entropic
security by using extractors [5].
Given the above backgrounds, we are interested in PS
defined by the variational distance, and its relation to IND and
SS, which will be some help for comprehensive understanding
of information theoretically secure encryptions and computa-
tionally secure ones. However, as we will see in Definition 2,
three kinds of definitions of PS denoted by PS∗M (ε), PSC∗(ε),
and PSCM (ε) can be naturally introduced in terms of the
variational distance. It is obvious that these three notions of
PS are the same when ε = 0. However, in the case of ε > 0,
their relations are not known. In this paper, we will point
out that PS∗M (ε) is stronger than the others by showing a
pathological example. Furthermore, it will be proved that the
remaining two definitions PSC∗(ε) and PSCM (ε) guarantee
essentially the same security as the statistical versions of IND
and SS.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
notations and three variations of PS are introduced. Statistical
IND is introduced in section III, and the relations between PS
and statistical IND are clarified. A relation between statistical
IND and statistical SS is proven in Section IV. Finally, a gap
between one of three variations of PS and the other security
notions are pointed out in Section V. Technical lemmas are
provided in Appendix.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let M , K , and C be random variables taking values in
finite sets M, K, and C, which correspond to sets of messages,
keys, and cryptograms, respectively. For a random variable X
taking values in a finite set X and an element x ∈ X , denote
by PX(x) a probability of X = x. Let P(X ) be the totality
of probability distributions over X .
A symmetric key cryptography Σ consists of a probability
distribution PK ∈ P(K) of a key, and a pair of an encryption
function Enc : M × K → C, and a decryption function
Dec : C × K → M, i.e., Σ def= (PK ,Enc,Dec). Note that K
is chosen independently of a message M , and Enc and Dec
are deterministic maps. Suppose that a message is generated
according to a probability distribution PM ∈ P(M). Then, the
probability distribution PC of a cryptogram is determined by
PM , PK and Enc. Let PCM be a joint probability distribution
of a cryptogram C and a message M , and denote by PC|M
a conditional distribution of a cryptogram when a message is
given. Denote by PC|M an |C| × |M| transition probability
matrix1 associated with {PC|M (c|m)}c∈C,m∈M, i.e., each
element of PC|M corresponds to PC|M (c|m) for c ∈ C and
m ∈M. The following theorem states fundamental properties
of PC|M for symmetric key encryptions. The proof is provided
in Appendix A.
Theorem 1: If a key K is chosen independently of a mes-
sage M , it holds that2
∀c ∈ C, ∀m ∈M, PC|M (c|m) = Pr {Enc(m,K) = c} . (1)
Furthermore, in the case of |C| = |M|, there exists a
symmetric key cryptosystem Σ satisfying (1) iff (if and only if)
the probability transition matrix PC|M is doubly stochastic3.

Hence, we assume that the conditional probability distribu-
tion PC|M (c|m), c ∈ C, m ∈M is naturally defined by (1) if
a symmetric key cryptosystem Σ is given.
Shannon defined the notion of perfect secrecy as follows:
Definition 1 (Perfect secrecy, [1]): A symmetric key cryp-
tosystem Σ = (PK ,Enc,Dec) guarantees perfect secrecy if
∀c ∈ C, ∀m ∈M, PM|C(m|c) = PM (m) (2)
is satisfied for arbitrary message distribution PM . 
Definition 1 means that no information of a message can
be obtained from a cryptogram since a priori probability
distribution PM of a message coincides with a posteriori
probability distribution of M computed by an adversary using
a cryptogram.
It is easy to see that (2) is equivalent to
∀c ∈ C, ∀m ∈ M, PC|M (c|m) = PC(c) (3)
∀c ∈ C, ∀m ∈ M, PCM (c,m) = PC(c)PM (m) (4)
since (2) means that random variables M and C are statisti-
cally independent.
We are now consider relaxed definitions of perfect secrecy.
That is, we define almost independence between a message M
and a cryptogramC given by (2)–(4) in terms of the variational
(statistical) distance4 denoted by d(·, ·).
Definition 2: For a real number ε ∈ [0, 1], we say that a
symmetric key cryptosystem Σ is PS∗M (ε)–, PSC∗(ε)–, or
PSCM (ε)–secure if Σ satisfies the following conditions:
PS∗M (ε): ∀PM ∈ P(M),
∀c ∈ C, d(PM|C(·|c), PM (·)) ≤ ε
1| · | denotes the cardinality of a set.
2Pr {·} is a probability with respect to a (joint) probability distribution of
random variable(s) between the parentheses.
3A probability transition matrix PC|M is doubly stochastic iff∑
c∈C PC|M (c|m) =
∑
m∈M PC|M (c|m) = 1 holds.
4For two probability distributions PX , PY over a finite set A, the varia-
tional distance d(·, ·) is defined by d(PX , PY )
def
= (1/2)
∑
a∈A |PX(a)−
PY (a)| = maxf :A→{0,1} |Pr {f(X) = 1} − Pr {f(Y ) = 1} |.
PSC∗(ε): ∀PM ∈ P(M),
∀m ∈ M, d(PC|M (·|m), PC(·)) ≤ ε
PSCM (ε): ∀PM ∈ P(M),
d(PCM (·|·), PC(·)PM (·)) ≤ ε 
As shown above, PS∗M (0), PSC∗(0) and PSCM (0) are
equivalent to (2)–(4), respectively, and they are all equivalent.
In this paper, we are interested in relations among these
security notions when ε is positive and sufficiently small. The
main results of this paper are summarized as follows:
• PS∗M (ε) is the strongest among three security notions in
Definition 2, which reflects the observation that PS∗M (ε)
is the most straightforward extension of (2) in Definition
1.
• Two security notions in Definition 2 except for PS∗M (ε)
are equivalent to each other, and they are essentially
equivalent to the statistical versions of indistinguishability
and semantic security which will be introduced later. As a
result, it is clarified that indistinguishability and semantic
security are weaker security notions even if they are
formulated in information theoretically secure setting.
III. PERFECT SECRECY AND INDISTINGUISHABILITY
We reformulate the security notion of indistinguishability
denoted by IND(ε) which is suitable for information theoret-
ically secure setting. Then, we discuss the relation between
IND(ε) and three notions of perfect secrecy presented in
Definition 2.
It is easy to see that (3) is also represented as ∀m0, ∀m1 ∈
M, ∀c ∈ C, PC|M (c|m0) = PC|M (c|m1)
5
, which is equiva-
lent to
∀m0, ∀m1 ∈M, d(PC|M (·|m0), PC|M (·|m1)) = 0. (5)
Note that (5) implies that cryptograms corresponding to ar-
bitrarily chosen messages m0 and m1 cannot be statistically
distinguished.
We now relax the condition given by (5) using a real number
ε ∈ [0, 1] such that
∀m0, ∀m1 ∈ M, d(PC|M (·|m0), PC|M (·|m1)) ≤ ε. (6)
According to the definition of variational distance,
d(PX , PY ) ≤ ε can be rewritten as
∀f : A → {0, 1},
∣∣Pr {f(X) = 1} − Pr {f(Y ) = 1}∣∣ ≤ ε (7)
and hence, (6) is equivalent to
∀m0 ∈ M, ∀m1 ∈M, ∀f : C → {0, 1},
|Pr {f(C) = 1 |M = m0} − Pr {f(C) = 1|M = m1} |
≤ ε. (8)
Note that, (8) is the definiton of computational indistin-
guishability if the function f is restricted to the family of
functions which can be computed in polynomial time [7, 8].
5According to (1) and Theorem 1, perfect secrecy equivalent to ∀m0 ∈M,
∀m1 ∈ M, ∀c ∈ C, Pr {Enc(m0,K) = c} = Pr {Enc(m1, K) = c},
which appears in [6, Proposition 9.3–7.].
Hence, we introduce a security notion of statistical indistin-
guishability based on (8) as follows.
Definition 3: For a real number ε ∈ [0, 1], we say
that a symmetric key cryptosystem Σ is statistically ε–
indistinguishable (IND(ε)–secure, for short) if Σ satisfies (6)
(and also (8)). 
Remark 1: Statistical indistinguishability introduced by
Dodis–Smith [4] looks different from Definition 3, but it is
easy to show that they are essentially the same. 
In the following, we clarify the relation among security
notions in Definitions 2 and 3.
Theorem 2: For an arbitrary ε ∈ [0, 1], a symmetric key
cryptosystem Σ is PSC∗(ε)–secure iff Σ is IND(ε)–secure. 
Proof of Theorem 2: Observe for every m ∈M that
d
(
PC|M (·|m), PC(·)
)
=
1
2
∑
c∈C
∣∣∣∣∣PC|M (c|m)−
∑
m′∈M
PC|M (c|m
′)PM (m
′)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
c∈C
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m′∈M
PM (m
′)
{
PC|M (c|m)− PC|M (c|m
′)
}∣∣∣∣∣
(9)
First, we show that Σ is PSC∗(ε)–secure if Σ is IND(ε)–
secure. In this case, we assume that ∀m, ∀m′ ∈ M,
d(PC|M (·|m), PC|M (·|m
′)) ≤ ε, and hence, from (9) we have
d
(
PC|M (·|m), PC(·)
)
≤
1
2
∑
m′∈M
PM (m
′)
∑
c∈C
∣∣PC|M (c|m)− PC|M (c|m′)∣∣
=
∑
m′∈M
PM (m
′)d
(
PC|M (·|m), PC|M (·|m
′)
)
≤
∑
m′∈M
PM (m
′) ε
= ε (10)
and hence Σ is PSC∗(ε)–secure.
We prove the converse. Suppose that Σ is PSC∗(ε)–secure.
Substitute both m = m0 and
PM (m
′) = δm1(m
′)
def
=
{
1, if m′ = m1
0, otherwise (11)
into (9). Then, we obtain
d(PC|M (·|m0), PC(·)) = d(PC|M (·|m0), PC|M (·|m1))
≤ ε. (12)
Hence, Σ is IND(ε)–secure if it is PSC∗(ε)–secure. 
The next theorem implies an equivalence between IND(ε)
and PSCM (ε).
Theorem 3: For an arbitrary ε ∈ [0, 1], a symmetric key
cryptosystem Σ is PSCM (ε)–secure if Σ is IND(ε)–secure.
Conversely, if Σ is PSCM (ε)–secure, it is IND(2ε)–secure. 
Proof of Theorem 3: This proof is essentially the same with
Theorem 2. Observe that d(PCM , PCPM ) can be calculated
as follows:
d(PCM (·, ·), PC(·)PM (·))
=
1
2
∑
c∈C
∑
m∈M
|PCM (c,m)− PC(c)PM (m)|
=
1
2
∑
c∈C
∑
m∈M
PM (m)
∣∣PC|M (c|m)− PC(c)∣∣
=
1
2
∑
c∈C
∑
m∈M
PM (m)
×
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m′∈M
PM (m
′)
{
PC|M (c|m)− PC|M (c|m
′)
}∣∣∣∣∣ (13)
We show that Σ is PSCM (ε)–secure if Σ is IND(ε)–secure.
In this case, we have from (13) that
d(PCM (·, ·), PC(·)PM (·))
≤
∑
m,m′∈M
PM (m)PM (m
′)d(PC|M (·|m), PC|M (·|m
′))
≤ ε (14)
if ∀m, ∀m′ ∈ M, d(PC|M (·|m), PC|M (·|m′)) ≤ ε. Hence, if
Σ is IND(ε)–secure, it is also PSCM (ε)–secure.
Then, suppose that Σ is PSCM (ε)–secure. Then, substitut-
ing
PM (m) =
{
1/2, if m = m0 or m = m1
0, otherwise (15)
into (13), it follows that
d(PCM , PCPM ) =
1
2
d(PC|M (·|m0), PC|M (·|m1)) ≤ ε. (16)
Hence, Σ is IND(2ε)–secure if it is PSCM (ε)–secure. 
We have proved that PSC∗(ε), PSCM (ε), and IND(ε) are
the same security notions. On the other hand, in section V,
we show an example that PS∗M (ε) is stronger security notion
than the others in the case of ε > 0.
IV. PERFECT SECRECY AND SEMANTIC SECURITY
We consider the relation between perfect secrecy and se-
mantic security in information theoretically secure setting.
Here, IND(ε) also plays a crucial role.
Definition 4 (Statistical semantic security, [3]): For every
real number ε ∈ [0, 1] we say that a symmetric key cryptosys-
tem Σ = (PK ,Enc,Dec) is statistically ε–semantic secure
(SS(ε)–secure, for short) if, for an arbitrary distribution of
a message PM ∈ P(M) and for an arbitrary map f : C →
{0, 1}, there exists a random variable Gf that depends on f but
is independent of M , so that for every map h :M→ {0, 1},
it holds that∣∣Pr {f(C) = h(M)} − Pr {Gf = h(M)}∣∣ ≤ ε. (17)

Intuitively, Definition 4 implies that a cryptogram C is
almost useless to obtain any one bit information of a message
M , since (17) implies that, in order to guess one bit informa-
tion h(M) of a message M , there is no difference between
by using a cryptogram C and a map f , and by using f only
with a random coin.
Remark 2: In [3], (t, ε)–entropic security is defined if a
symmetric key cryptosystem Σ satisfies Definition 4 for every
message with min-entropy t, and it is shown that the key
length is reduced to n − t + ω(logn) bits for (t, n−ω(1))–
entropic security6. Hence, Definition 4 coincides with (0, ε)–
entropic security. Furthermore, it is pointed out in [3] that
(0, 0)–entropic security is equivalent to PS in Definition 1. 
We are interested in the relation between PS introduced in
Definition 2, and statistical semantic security SS(ε) when ε >
0. To see this, we show the following relation between IND(ε)
and SS(ε).
Theorem 4: For arbitrary ε ∈ [0, 1], if a symmetric key
cryptosystem Σ is IND(ε)–secure, then Σ is also SS(ε)–secure.
Conversely, if Σ is SS(ε)–secure, then it is also IND(4ε)–
secure. 
Proof of Theorem 4: First, we prove that Σ is SS(ε)–secure
if Σ is IND(ε)–secure. This proof is essentially the same
with the proof appeared in [8] under computationally secure
setting. Let M∗ be a random variable of a message which
is independent of the legitimate message M . Then, assume
that the random variable Gf is generated by PC|M (c|m) and
M∗, i.e., we define that Gf
def
= f(C∗) where PC∗(c)
def
=∑
m1
PC|M (c|m1)PM∗(m1) for c ∈ C and m ∈ M.
Let us define an indicator function If,h : C ×M → {0, 1}
for maps f and h such that
If,h(c,m) =
{
1, if f(c) = h(m)
0, otherwise. (18)
Then, the left hand side of (17) can be evaluated as
|Pr {f(C) = h(M)} − Pr {Gf = h(M)}|
= |Pr {f(C) = h(M)} − Pr {f(C∗) = h(M)}|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c,m0
If,h(c,m0) {PCM (c,m0)− PC∗M (c,m0)}
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c,m0
If,h(c,m0)PM (m0)
{
PC|M (c|m0)− PC∗(c)
}∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m0,m1
PM (m0)PM∗(m1)
×
∑
c
If,h(c,m0){PC|M (c|m0)− PC|M (c|m1)}
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m0,m1
PM (m0)PM∗(m1)×
{
Pr {fh,m0(C) = 1|M = m0}
− Pr {fh,m0(C) = 1|M = m1}
}∣∣∣∣, (19)
where fh,m0 : C → {0, 1} is defined by fh,m0(c) = 1 iff
If,h(c,m) = 1. Then, due to the definition of IND(ε) given
6f = ω(g) ⇔ ∀ǫ > 0,∃n0,∀n ≥ n0, g(n) ≤ ǫf(n).
by (5), it is easy to see that (19) can be bounded from above
by
∑
m0,m1∈M
PM (m0)PM∗(m1) · ε = ε.
Conversely, we show that Σ is IND(4ε)–secure if Σ is
SS(ε)–secure. Assuming that a symmetric key cryptosystem
Σ is SS(ε)–secure, there exist an arbitrary f : C → {0, 1} and
a random variable Gf that depends on f but is independent
of M , and (17) holds for an arbitrary h :M→ {0, 1}.
Now, letting h be a map that always outputs 1 for every
m ∈M, it holds for arbitrary f : C → {0, 1} that
∣∣Pr {f(C) = 1} − Pr {Gf = 1}∣∣ ≤ ε (20)
which is equivalent to
∣∣Pr {f(C) = 0} − Pr {Gf = 0}∣∣ ≤ ε. (21)
Hence, for ℓ ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that
Pr {f(C) = ℓ} ≥ Pr {Gf = ℓ} − ε (22)
Multiplying both sides by Pr {h(M) = ℓ} ≥ 0, we have
Pr {f(C) = ℓ}Pr {h(M) = ℓ}
≥
(
Pr {Gf = ℓ} − ε
)
Pr {h(M) = ℓ} , (23)
and hence, it follows that
∑
ℓ∈{0,1}
Pr{f (C ) = ℓ}Pr {h(M) = ℓ}
≥
∑
ℓ∈{0,1}
(
Pr {Gf = ℓ} − ε
)
Pr {h(M) = ℓ}
≥ Pr {Gf = h(M)} − ε. (24)
From (17) we obtain
Pr{f(C) = h(M)} −
∑
ℓ∈{0,1}
Pr {f(C) = ℓ}Pr {h(M) = ℓ}
≤ Pr {f(C) = h(M)} − Pr {Gf = h(M)}+ ε
≤ 2ε. (25)
Similarly, by evaluating the upper bound of Pr {f(C) = ℓ},
ℓ ∈ {0, 1}, we have
∣∣∣∣Pr {f(C) = h(M)}
−
∑
ℓ∈{0,1}
Pr {f(C) = ℓ}Pr {h(M) = ℓ}
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2ε (26)
Applying Lemma 1 in Appendix B to this inequality7, it holds
that
∣∣∣Pr {f(C) = h(M) = 1}
− Pr {f(C) = 1}Pr {h(M) = 1}
∣∣∣ ≤ ε. (27)
7Let X and Y in Lemma 1 be f(C) and h(M), respectively.
Since PM ∈ P(M) is arbitrary, we set PM in the same way
as (15) for arbitrarily fixed m0,m1 ∈ M, and let h(m) =
δm0(m) which is defined by (11). Then, (27) becomes
Pr {M = m0}
∣∣∣∣Pr {f(C) = 1 |M = m0}
−
∑
ℓ∈{0,1}
Pr {f(C) = 1 |M = mℓ}Pr {M = mℓ}
∣∣∣∣
=
1
4
∣∣∣∣Pr {f(C) = 1 |M = m0} − Pr {f(C) = 1 |M = m1}
∣∣∣∣
≤ ε. (28)
Therefore, d(PC|M (·|m0), PC|M (·|m1)) ≤ 4ε is established
for every m0,m1 ∈ M. 
V. A GAP BETWEEN PERFECT SECRECY AND
INDISTINGUISHABILITY, SEMANTIC SECURITY
We show an exmaple of a symmetric key cryptosystem
Σ that is IND(ε)–secure (and hence, it is also PSC∗(ε)–
and PSCM (ε)–secure) with arbitrarily small ε > 0, while
it is PS∗M (ε′)–secure with ε′ ≥ 1/2. This fact means that
PS∗M (ε) is stronger than the other security notions. We note
that PS∗M (ε) is a straightforward extension of Shannon’s
perfect secrecy given by (2) in Definition 1.
Example 1: For an arbitrary even integer n, define C =
{c1, c2, . . . , cn} and M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}. Then, consider
the following n×n probability transition matrix corresponding
to PC|M such that
PC|M
=


n−1 + δ n−1 − δ · · · n−1 + δ n−1 − δ
n−1 − δ n−1 + δ · · · n−1 − δ n−1 + δ
n−1 n−1 · · · n−1 n−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
n−1 n−1 · · · n−1 n−1


(29)
where δ = ε/2 ∈ (0, n−1], and the (i, j) element of PC|M is
equal to PC|M (ci|mj). From Theorem 1, note that there exists
a symmetric key cryptosystem Σex corresponding to (29) since
it is doubly stochastic.
It is easy to check that d(PC|M (·|mi), PC|M (·|mj)) is equal
to 0 or 2δ (= ε) for each mi,mj ∈ M. Hence, PC|M realizes
a IND(ε)–secure symmetric key cryptosystem (and hence, it
is also PSC∗(ε)–, and PSCM (ε)–secure).
On the other hand, for uniformly distributed messages,
i.e., PM (mi) = 1/n, ∀mi ∈ M, it is easy to see that
the the transition probability matrix PM|C corresponding to
a family of posteriori conditional probability distributions
{PM|C(m|c)}c∈C,m∈M corresponds to the transposed matrix
of PC|M . Hence, in this case
d(PM|C(·|c), PM (·)) =
{
nδ/2, if c = c1 or c2
0, otherwise (30)
TABLE I
PXY AND ITS MARGINALS
x\y 0 1 PX(x)
0 a b a+ b
1 c d c+ d
PY (y) a+ c b+ d 1
which implies that Σex is PS∗M (ε′)–secure with8 ε′ ≥ nδ/2.
In particular, ε′ ≥ 1/2 for every n if ε = 2/n (= 2δ) which
can be arbitrarily small for sufficiently large n. 
In this example, the symmetric key cryptosystem Σex given
by (29) violates d(PM|C(·|c), PM (·)) ≤ ε with the negligibly
small probability Pr {C = c1 ∨C = c2} = 2/n if PM is
uniform and n is sufficiently large, although it is required
by PS∗M (ε)–security to satisfy d(PM|C(·|c), PM (·)) ≤ ε for
every c ∈ C. On the other hand, Σex is still considered to be
secure under the other security notions since they focus on
the probability distribution of C and the probability that such
insecure cryptograms are output is negligible.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Observe that a random variable C of a cryptogram is ob-
tained by C = Enc(M,K), where M and K are independent
8Note that d(PM|C(·|c), PC(·)) ≤ ε holds for every PM to ensure
PS∗M (ε)–secure cryptosystems.
random variables of a message and a key, respectively, and
Enc :M×K → C is a deterministic map of encryption. Hence,
the joint probability distribution PCM (c,m) of a cryptogram
and a message can be represented as
PCM (c,m) = Pr {C = c,M = m}
= Pr {Enc(M,K) = c,M = m}
=
∑
k:Enc(m,k)=c
PMK(m, k)
(∗)
= PM (m)
∑
k:Enc(m,k)=c
PK(k)
= PM (m)Pr {Enc(m,K) = c} , (31)
where the marked equality holds since M and K are indepen-
dent. Hence, we have (1).
In what follows, we consider the case of |M| = |C|. In this
case, if k ∈ K is fixed, there exists a bijection πk : M →
C since every cryptogram c ∈ C can be uniquely decrypted
by k ∈ K. Hence, for each k ∈ K, let Πk ∈ {0, 1}n×n be
a permutation matrix which corresponds to the bijection πk.
Then, it is easy to see that the probability transition matrix
induced by Enc and K can be represented as
PC|M =
∑
k∈K
PK(k)Πk, (32)
which is doubly stochastic. Conversely, due to Birkoff–von
Neumann Theorem, there exists a pair of PK(k) and Πk, k ∈
K, satisfying (32) if PC|M is doubly stochastic. 
B. Lemma in Proof of Theorem 4
In proof of Theorem 4, we use the following lemma:
Lemma 1: For two binary random variables X and Y over
a set {0, 1}, and for ε ∈ [0, 1], the following two inequalities
are equivalent:∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr {X = Y } −
∑
ℓ∈{0,1}
Pr {X = ℓ}Pr {Y = ℓ}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε (33)∣∣∣Pr {X = Y = ℓ} − Pr {X = ℓ}Pr {Y = ℓ} ∣∣∣ ≤ ε
2
,
ℓ ∈ {0, 1} (34)

We show that (33) ⇒ (34) since (34) ⇒ (33) is obvious.
Letting PXY (x, y), x, y ∈ {0, 1} be a joint probability
distribution of X and Y given by TABLE I, (33) is equivalent
to ∣∣a+ d− (a+ b)(a+ c)− (c+ d)(b + d)∣∣ ≤ ε. (35)
Since it holds that a+b+c+d= 1, (35) becomes |ad−bc| ≤
ε/2. Furthermore, using a+ b+ c+ d = 1 again, we have∣∣PXY (0, 0)− PX(0)PY (0)∣∣ = ∣∣a− (a+ b)(a+ c)∣∣ ≤ ε
2
(36)
∣∣PXY (1, 1)− PX(1)PY (1)∣∣ = ∣∣d− (c+ d)(b + d)∣∣ ≤ ε
2
(37)
which implies (33). 
Remark 3: Note that (33) ⇒ (34) does not generally hold
if X and Y are not binary random variables. 
